Mandatory Voir Dire Questions in Capital Cases: A Potential Solution to the Biases of Death Qualification by Nason, Jesse
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 5
Fall 2004
Mandatory Voir Dire Questions in Capital Cases:
A Potential Solution to the Biases of Death
Qualification
Jesse Nason
Roger Williams University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger
Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nason, Jesse (2004) "Mandatory Voir Dire Questions in Capital Cases: A Potential Solution to the Biases of Death Qualification,"
Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 10: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol10/iss1/5
Mandatory Voir Dire Questions in
Capital Cases: A Potential Solution to
the Biases of Death Qualification
"Given the important, delicate, and complex nature of the
death qualification process, there can be no substitute for
thorough and searching inquiry.. "1
I. INTRODUCTION
The above quotation emphasizes the importance of voir dire in
a capital case. Because of the gravity of the death penalty as an
available punishment, courts should do everything possible to en-
sure capital voir dire results in a fair, impartial jury that is able to
follow the rule of law. Unfortunately, it seems this result fails to
occur under the current form of death qualification.
Voir dire differs in capital cases as compared with other trials
in that jurors must be "death qualified" to serve in a capital case.
While "death qualified" has meant different things to different
courts, the term is most commonly used to describe a venire per-
son able to follow both the juror's oath and the law, despite what-
ever personal feelings that individual may harbor either for or
against the death penalty.2 In contrast, death qualification "ex-
cludables," or "non-death qualifiers," are those eliminated from a
capital jury because they cannot follow the law and the juror oath.
While this may seem like a reasonable manner to empanel a fair
jury, empiricists have found that death qualification results in un-
fair juries with many pro-prosecution biases.3
Many social scientists believe there are a number of flaws in-
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1. State v. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172, 1182 (N.J. 1988).
2. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
3. See discussion infra Part II.
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herent in the current process of death qualification. 4 Studies have
shown that death qualified jurors are more likely to convict a de-
fendant than non-death qualifiers. 5 Additionally, studies have
demonstrated that individuals eligible to sit on capital juries are
more likely to have other attitudes related to their death penalty
beliefs that effect their interpretation of the case in favor of the
prosecution, despite their ability to follow the juror oath and the
rule of law.6
For instance, because ideas do not occur in a vacuum, 7 those
who qualify as capital jurors are more likely to be classified as le-
gal authoritarians, s and thus may believe in a crime control model
of criminal justice.9 Crime control theorists are predisposed to be-
lieve the prosecution's version of events and witnesses, 10 and are
more likely to think a defendant is guilty before any evidence is
heard in the case.'1 These attitudes, thought to be held by many
death qualified jurors, undermine the notion of a presumption of
4. As a cautionary note, it appears that after thorough examination of
the empirical studies, social scientists tend to base their research on a defini-
tion of death qualification that focuses on those who can serve on a capital
jury because their moral beliefs will not interfere with their ability to be im-
partial. See discussion infra Part II. This definition, however, fails to take
into account those individuals not morally opposed to the death penalty, but
rather will not enforce it because of their lack of faith in the ability of the jus-
tice system to be conclusive enough to warrant imposition of death. Those in-
dividuals are not death qualified because they would not be able to follow the
juror instructions requiring consideration of death as an available punish-
ment. It would be interesting to ascertain whether those jurors would have
the same tendencies as those who are not death qualified for moral reasons.
5. William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction
Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
95, 109 (1984).
6. See id. at 97.
7. See id. ("[Attitudes toward the death penalty do not exist in isolation
but are associated with a cluster of other attitudes and beliefs about criminal
justice.").
8. Douglas J. Narby et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Association Between
Authoritarianism and Jurors' Perceptions of Defendant Culpability, 78 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 34, 40-41 (1993).
9. See Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime
Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 31,
46-48 (1984).
10. See Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Ju-
rors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 53, 69 (1984).
11. See Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 9, at 48.
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innocence. Furthermore, death qualification has the adverse ef-
fects of frequently excluding minorities and women, 12 and foster-
ing a jury with a homogenous attitude toward the legal system,
resulting in poorer jury deliberation and a jury stacked against
the defendant. 13
Despite the abundance of research indicating these flaws,
courts have refused to lend much positive credence to those find-
ings.14 The research in this area has been developing for several
decades, but the United States Supreme Court continues to hold it
inconclusive and unsubstantial. 15 However, even though the Court
has been reluctant to rely on the empirical data, it has been forced
to revise the death qualification process on several occasions, indi-
cating that there are flaws inherent in the current process. 16 This
Comment proposes that courts should take a further step to revise
death qualification by requiring judges in capital cases to ask a
minimum mandatory set of voir dire questions aimed at eliciting
death qualified jurors who are not burdened with the pro-
prosecution biases many current death qualifiers may possess.
"The essential function of voir dire is to enable counsel to
gather information sufficient to make well informed decisions
about jurors whose biases may interfere with a fair consideration
of the evidence." 17 The problem with death qualification in its pre-
sent state is that, while it seeks to find jurors who can follow the
law, many of those jurors may still have attitudes that make them
more conviction prone. If voir dire questions can be utilized to
identify jurors who would both follow the law and be impartial,
then the process as a whole would become fairer for defendants
and would help the court maintain an image of impartiality. Be-
cause the Court has already regulated voir dire in a variety of
12. See id. at 46-47 (including a table comparing death qualification re-
sults based on major demographic characteristics).
13. Cowan et al., supra note 10, at 55.
14. See discussion infra Part III.B.
15. See discussion infra Part III.
16. See discussion infra Part III.
17. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant John Javilo McCul-
lah's Request For Voir Dire Procedures at 1, United States v. McCullah, No.
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ways, 18 this Comment's thesis does not suggest a radical depar-
ture from Supreme Court jurisprudence. Instead, it proposes one
of the few practical solutions to the complex problem of how to im-
panel a jury in a capital case able to impartially hear a trial.
Part II of this Comment will explore the empirical research in
this area and discuss the biases inherent in the current death
qualification process. Part III will examine the reasons the Su-
preme Court has given for rejecting the empirical research and its
justifications for allowing death qualification in its current state.
The Comment will conclude in Part IV with a proposal that judges
be required to ask specific questions during voir dire to ascertain
which jurors have less death qualified biases, thereby ensuring a
fairer legal process.
II. THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON DEATH QUALIFICATION BIASES
A. Jurors Retained Through the Process of Death Qualification
As the court opinions discussed below indicate, 19 many legal
experts do not believe death qualification results in a jury with bi-
ases significant enough to render the current method of jury selec-
tion unconstitutional. Several social scientists, however, hold
contrary opinions and have attempted to demonstrate that death
qualifiers as a group have biases that deny the defendant in a
capital case his right to a fair and impartial jury. Many of these
studies, however, have been examined and rejected by the
courts.20 Nevertheless, it is important to understand what the at-
titudes and biases are that researchers allege death qualifiers
have. It is also important to understand what characteristics and
attitudes are consistently being eliminated from capital juries
through death qualification. For if the empirical research on death
qualification is correct, then the process may not be as impartial
as the courts would like society to believe. More importantly, these
attitudes must be understood to develop an appropriate solution to
eradicate the alleged flaws in the process.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. See discussion infra Part III.
20. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168-73 (1986).
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1. Are Death Qualified Jurors More Likely to be Conviction Prone?
One of the most crucial potential problems of death qualifica-
tion is conviction proneness. In 1971, George Jurow was the first
to accept the Witherspoon Court's implicit invitation for further
research in the area.21 Through his research,22 Jurow began to
elaborate on the ideas of conviction proneness first put forth by
Wilson,23 and later developed by Zeisel,24 both studies rejected in
Witherspoon.25 Jurow noted the predominance of those in favor of
the death penalty as being more likely to convict.26 The problem
with this study, however, is even if the data is accurate, its practi-
cal implications are arguably limited. Some researchers attempt
to use the theory of conviction proneness as a means of demon-
strating that the defendant in a capital case is going into trial
21. See Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 9, at 37-38; Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18 (1968); see also George L. Jurow, New Data on
the Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971).
22. The subjects in Jurow's study were divided into groups based upon
how they responded, on a five-point scale, on when they could or could not
administer the death penalty. Cowan et al., supra note 10, at 57-58. In one
portion of the study, his data indicated that 44.7% of death qualified subjects
voted to convict, as opposed to only 33.3% of the excludables. Id.
23. Id. at 56. Wilson found that individuals with objections to the death
penalty were less likely to convict a defendant in the guilt phase of a trial
when compared with those jurors who had no scruples against the death pen-
alty. Id. Wilson separated college students into two groups based upon their
responses to whether or not they had "conscientious scruples" against the
death penalty. Id. Students were given cases to read and provided what their
vote would be had they been on the jury. Id. Mock jurors with no scruples
against capital punishment were more likely to convict the defendant. Id.
While this "conscientious scruples" test is no longer the death qualification
standard, this study may serve as an indication that death penalty attitudes
are tied to conviction proneness. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424
(1985) (holding that the standard is whether a prospective juror's views on
capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair" his or her ability
to follow juror instructions in accordance with his or her oath).
24. Cowan et al., supra note 10, at 57. Zeisel interviewed jurors who had
previously sat on actual felony juries. Id. He asked them three questions:
what the whole jury voted on the first ballot, what their individual vote was,
and if they had any scruples against the death penalty. Id. Like Wilson,
Zeisel found that jurors who favored the death penalty were more likely to
convict the defendant. Id.
25. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516-18.
26. Jurow, supra note 21, at 584-85.
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with a jury stacked against him.2 7 If Jurow's data is an accurate
representation of human attitudes, however, less than half the
death qualifiers elected to convict the defendant.28 While death
qualified jurors do convict more than death excludables according
to the research, Jurow's data indicates that it is not at an extraor-
dinarily higher rate, and therefore may not be as large of a prob-
lem as researchers claim. 29
As time has passed, however, more reliable methods of evalu-
ating death qualified jurors have developed offering potentially
greater accuracy in demonstrating the presence of conviction
proneness. 30 One such study was conducted by William C. Thomp-
son's research group, which established the conviction proneness
of death qualified jurors through the administration of a "Regret
Scale."31 The researchers concluded that death qualifiers are con-
viction prone because they are more likely to feel worse about let-
ting a guilty man go free than about wrongfully convicting an
27. See, e.g., Cowan et al., supra note 10, at 53; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth,
supra note 9, at 31.
28. See supra note 22.
29. Jurow's second case study, however, resulted in 60% of death qualifi-
ers and only 42.9% of death excludables voting to convict. Cowan et al., supra
note 10, at 58. This demonstrates a larger difference - almost 20% - in con-
viction proneness between the two groups, indicating that death qualifiers
may in fact find the defendant guilty more frequently.
30. See, e.g., Irwin A. Horowitz & David G. Seguin, The Effects of Bifur-
cation and Death Qualification on Assignment of Penalty in Capital Crimes,
16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 165, 165, 180-81 (1986). Horowitz and Seguin's
research also found that death qualified jurors are more likely to convict. In
that study, participants were divided into different mock juries and classified
as either death qualified or non-death qualified. Id. at 172-73. The groups
then heard either the guilt or sentencing phase of the trial. Id. The research
indicated that the death qualified jury that heard both the guilt and sentenc-
ing phases of the trial gave the most severe verdicts. Id. at 180-81.
Interestingly enough, this is the procedure used in almost all capital tri-
als. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 427 (justifying the use of
having one jury decide both stages of the trial - guilt and penalty - because a
single jury process avoids repetitive proceedings and ensures the defendant
the benefit of any residual doubt jurors may feel regarding guilt at sentenc-
ing). Therefore, those who will be the harshest toward capital defendants are
the ones trying capital defendants. What is even more fascinating about this
study is, while it showed that death qualifiers are more conviction prone, the
non-death qualified jurors still convicted the defendant eight out of eleven
times. See Horowitz & Sequin, supra, at 176. This may indicate that the fear
that many courts may have that non-death qualifiers would not convict at all
is simply untrue.
31. Thompson et al., supra note 5, at 106.
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innocent man.3 2 While the death qualifiers acknowledged that
there are times when innocent people are wrongly convicted, they
felt that this was a necessary flaw in the process of reducing crime
and controlling the behavior of actual criminals. 33 Therefore, the
researchers concluded that death qualifiers convict more fre-
quently and require less certainty of guilt because such persons
feel it is important to control crime, and they do not feel guilty if
they wrongly sentence a man to die, so long as the conviction was
the result of a process which aims to make society safer from real
law-breakers. 34
A problematic consequence of conviction proneness occurs
when the death penalty is sought in cases where the death penalty
would not be an appropriate punishment. Unlike judicial officers,
prosecutors who routinely deal in capital cases may fully subscribe
to the empirical data indicating the conviction proneness of capital
juries and make practical use of this proclivity. For instance, some
prosecutors may elect to use this information in an unethical fash-
ion, by requesting the death penalty specifically to get the benefits
of a death qualification process resulting in conviction prone ju-
ries.35 This may be done by prosecutors to increase the chances of
success at trial, even when the death penalty may not be appro-
priate in the particular case. 36 Even the most hardened supporters
of the death penalty should view this as an abuse of the process,37
for the death penalty should not be sought simply as a way to in-
32. See id. at 107.
33. See id. at 107-08.
34. Id. at 108.
35. This unethical prosecutorial practice has been addressed by both
commentators and judges. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 185,
188 n.4 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for failing to
address the possibility that the State will request the death penalty in par-
ticular cases solely to obtain a death qualified jury); Samuel R. Gross, Deter-
mining the Neutrality of Death-Qualified Juries: Judicial Appraisal of
Empirical Data, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 7, 13 (1984).
36. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 185 (stating that permitting such conduct
by the prosecutor causes the State to have a "special advantage in those
prosecutions where the charges are the most serious and the possible pun-
ishments, the most severe"); see also Gross, supra note 35, at 13.
37. There are formal guidelines and procedures a prosecutor must abide
by before a court will allow the death penalty to become available. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2000). It appears to be relatively simple, however, for a
prosecutor to satisfy the statutory requirements, thereby making the desired
goal of obtaining a death qualified jury relatively easy to achieve. See id.
20041 217
218 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 10:211
crease the chances of conviction.
2. Are Death Qualified Jurors More Likely To Favor Crime Control
over Due Process Rights?
Empiricists have unearthed many other biases, in addition to
conviction proneness, that death qualified jurors may have against
a defendant in capital cases. While the death qualification process
attempts to account for personal attitudes about the death pen-
alty, it fails to appreciate that attitudes do not occur in isolation.38
Thus, researchers believe other biases are linked to death penalty
attitudes that are not eliminated through current death qualifica-
tion requirements, and that these attitudes result in a jury that
favors the prosecution. 39
Researchers categorize individuals as having one of two types
of beliefs regarding the criminal justice system: the crime control
approach or the due process approach. 40 Those who believe in the
crime control ideology believe it is important to capture criminals
quickly and efficiently.41 They also generally believe that police
are capable of performing their jobs effectively, and therefore, that
most defendants who make it to trial are probably guilty because
the police most likely caught the right man.42 On the other hand,
those who have a due process mindset are more concerned with
the rights of individuals and are suspicious of state power.43
Unlike the crime control method, those who adopt a due process
approach have a strong belief in the presumption of innocence."
These distinctions are important because numerous studies indi-
cate that death qualifiers are more likely to favor a crime control
approach. 45
38. See Cowan et al., supra note 10, at 60.
39. Id.
40. Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 9, at 33-34.
41. Id. at 34.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 33.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 46-48. The authors noted the following regarding their
study:
[T]he results of our study are in line with previous research indicat-
ing that a person's attitude toward capital punishment is an impor-
tant indicator of a whole cluster of attitudes about crime control and
due process. Compared to the death qualified jurors, the members of
the excluded group are more concerned with the maintenance of the
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The categorization of veniremen into either a crime control or
due process approach represents a variety of ideas that individu-
als in each category may hold.46 Thompson's research group, in
concluding that death qualifiers were more likely to favor crime
control ideology, discussed how this would have a biasing effect on
the defendant. 47 For example, because of their crime control be-
liefs, death qualifiers may go into a trial presuming the guilt of a
defendant, and ambiguous evidence at trial will generally be in-
terpreted against a defendant. 48 For instance, if there are missing
details in a scenario of events, death qualifiers are more likely to
fill those gaps with information tending to confirm their belief
that the defendant committed the crime, and are more likely to
mentally visualize the defendant committing the criminal acts.49
Similarly, death qualifiers with a crime control attitude are more
readily willing to accept the prosecutor's version of the facts of the
case while remaining distrustful of defense witnesses.50 Thus,
these death qualified jurors would not likely give a defendant the
benefit of a reasonable doubt because they would be likely to in-
terpret the evidence against him and have trouble believing his
witnesses. This leads to the aforementioned problem of conviction
proneness, as well as a deprivation of a defendant's presumption
of innocence.
Another anti-defendant bias that has been found to be a fea-
ture of death qualified juries is an increased belief in a defendant's
culpability. In one study on this phenomenon, Jane Goodman-
Delahunty's research group concluded that death qualified jurors
fundamental due process guarantees of the Constitution, less puni-
tive, and less mistrustful of the defense.
Id.
46. See id. at 33.
47. Thompson et al., supra note 5, at 103-05.
48. See id. at 104-05.
49. Id. at 105 ("People construe ambiguities and 'fill-in' missing details in
accordance with their conception of how the scenario typically develops.").
50. See id.; see also Cowan et al., supra note 10, at 69. The Cowan re-
search group found that "death-qualified jurors were more impressed with
prosecution witnesses," and found the prosecutor more believable in compari-
son to death excludables' perceptions. Id. However, "[dleath-qualified and
death excludable jurors did not differ in their perceptions of the likability
[sic], competence, or believability of the defense attorney." Id. The question
remains, however, that if death excludables were allowed on capital juries,
would this not create a pro-defendant bias?
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differ from death excludables in their interpretation of the crimi-
nal mens rea.51 When participants of their study were shown a
videotaped criminal act, the death qualifiers were more likely to
believe that the crime was committed intentionally. 52 In contrast,
death excludables were less likely to believe that the criminal's ac-
tions were intentional. 53 The Goodman-Delahunty study concluded
by making four general conclusions about death qualifier attitudes
in general. The researchers found that jurors who were death
qualified were more likely to infer from the evidence: "(1) that the
defendant intended to murder the victim, (2) that his specific ac-
tions indicated premeditation, (3) that the defendant's substance
abuse did not mitigate his actions, and (4) that the defendant
would be a future threat to society."5 4
These conclusions demonstrate the harshness of the condi-
tions a defendant possibly must face in a capital trial. For in-
stance, while a jury is supposed to take into account mitigating
factors when determining guilt and an appropriate sentence, the
Goodman-Delahunty study found that death qualified jurors are
less likely to do this.55 Furthermore, because death qualifiers are
more likely to believe a defendant intended his crime and would
be a future threat to society,56 punishment will likely be harsher
than what death excludables might determine to be an appropri-
51. See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Constructing Motive in Video-
taped Killings: The Role of Jurors' Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty, 22
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 257, 265 (1998).
52. Id. at 269. The subjects in this study were shown a security tape of a
man killing a convenience store clerk. The actus reus - the fact that this man
committed the murder - was not in dispute; rather, the subjects were asked
to determine his criminal intent from the evidence, and thus decide on the
appropriate charge of first degree murder, second degree murder, or man-
slaughter. The charge would in turn determine whether the defendant would
be eligible for the death penalty, which could be invoked only if the defendant
was convicted of first degree murder. Id. at 262.
53. Id. at 265. The effect of this difference is obvious and quite problem-
atic for the defendant. Presumably, if death qualifiers are more convinced
that criminal acts are done intentionally, the result will be harsher punish-
ments for the defendant. For example, death qualifiers will more likely find a
defendant guilty of first degree murder than second degree murder or man-
slaughter. See id. at 269. It follows that in many instances, the effect of such
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ate sentence. These conclusions are especially troubling when one
considers that death qualified juries, the ones that were found to
give the harshest punishments,57 are only used in those cases
where the harshest punishment of all - the death penalty - is
available.
This is only a brief list of some anti-defendant biases re-
searchers have found a majority of death qualifiers possess. 58
These attitudes are linked to death penalty beliefs; therefore,
those who are not against the death penalty have been found to
hold these additional ideologies. 59 However, in addition to creating
a jury with many pro-prosecution beliefs, the death qualification
process also eliminates a number of characteristics that would
counter-balance these biases.
B. Juror Characteristics Excluded Through Death Qualification
While death qualification may result in a jury whose members
hold pro-prosecution attitudes, the process has the added negative
effects of consistently eliminating certain individuals with atti-
tudes and characteristics less biased toward conviction. In other
words, diversity that could ensure procedural fairness is reduced.
For instance, studies indicate that death qualification eliminates a
57. See Horowitz & Sequin, supra note 30, at 180.
58. One other final pro-prosecution attitude entangled with crime control
thinking is legal authoritarianism. Legal authoritarians are similar to classi-
cal authoritarians in that they look to society's rules and laws for discipline
and stability. This need for stability reflects their deep distrust of human be-
ings in general. Narby et al., supra note 8, at 34. Legal authoritarians are
those who are more likely than others to disregard the civil liberties and the
rights of an accused. Id. at 35. This may include a disregard of "the presump-
tion of innocence, the exclusive burden of proof borne by the prosecution, and
various [other] constitutional procedural safeguards." Id. These attitudes,
prevalent among death qualifiers bias the jury against a defendant because a
defendant is being denied his entitlement to certain rights and presumptions.
It would appear that the death qualification criteria would eliminate such le-
gal authoritarians from the jury because the process supposedly eliminates
those who cannot follow the law and their juror oath. See Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). The problem, however, is that legal authoritarians
are not eliminated under that standard; because they feel they are following
a more important law, one they feel helps to ensure the convictions of defen-
dants that they distrust and feel deserve punishment, the death qualification
process overlooks them. See Narby et al., supra note 8, at 34.
59. See, e.g., Cowan et al., supra note 10, at 69.
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large portion of women and minorities. 60 Fitzgerald and Ellsworth
examined this problem and concluded that death qualification
eliminates a very sizable number of these demographic groups
from service.61 This lack of diversity may presumably be harmful
to a defendant, particularly if a defendant is a woman or minority.
Researchers may have optimistically hoped that because of
their findings of inherent bias in the current death qualification
process, courts might once again reconsider the validity of death
qualification. Women and minorities have been held to be cogni-
zable groups that cannot be eliminated from a jury simply because
they are members of those classes.62 If it is true that death qualifi-
cation frequently results in such removal, the courts might be
more willing to once again redefine the death qualification process
so that it no longer yields an unconstitutional result.
Death qualification also reduces diversity of ideas and percep-
tions causing juror deliberation to suffer.63 Due to this homogene-
ity of attitudes concerning the criminal justice system that death
qualified juries have been found to possess, most death qualified
jurors are likely to view a trial similarly and interpret evidence
and witness credibility in a like manner.6 Therefore, deliberations
will likely be shorter and there will be less discussion of the trial.
On the other hand, in studies of mixed juries composed of
both death and non-death qualified jurors, there was a higher
quality of deliberations.65 Because the jurors had dissimilar atti-
tudes on criminal justice ideals, the trial was interpreted differ-
ently among the individual jurors. Consequently, there was more
discussion about the evidence and facts, and more points of the
60. E.g., id. at 67.
61. See Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 9, at 46. Their research indi-
cated that 21% of all women jurors and 25.5% of all black jurors are elimi-
nated from serving on capital juries due to the death qualification process. Id.
62. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that "the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors
solely on account of their race"); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975)
(holding that women as a class may not be excluded from juries based solely
on their sex).
63. See Cowan et al., supra note 10, at 75-76.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 60 ("[The jurors] need only be different. In losing a different
viewpoint the jury loses some of its capacity for controversy and self-
criticism.").
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trial were raised during the deliberations. 66 The lack of quality de-
liberation that results from death qualification is important be-
cause the ever-lofty ideal purpose of a trial is to "find the truth."
The only way to accomplish this is to look at the situation from a
variety of perspectives, and this simply cannot happen after death
qualification virtually wipes out dissimilar perceptions from the
jury.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DEATH QUALIFICATION
Due to its controversial nature, the legality and fairness of
death qualification has come before the courts on numerous occa-
sions. Throughout the years, the United States Supreme Court
has held the death qualification process constitutionally sound.67
However, this far from proves the process is the fairest procedure
to obtain a capital jury.
A. Development of the Death Qualification Standard - Changes in
Definition
The first major Supreme Court case that truly addressed the
relationship between death qualified juror attitudes and their
function in the legal system was Witherspoon v. Illinois.68 An Illi-
nois jury had sentenced Witherspoon to death after the prosecu-
tion eliminated nearly half of the venire group on challenges. 69
The trial court allowed the prosecution to go so far as to eliminate
anyone who said they were opposed to the death penalty, or "ex-
pressed qualms about capital punishment."70 Witherspoon at-
tacked the use of challenges on those jurors and claimed that such
66. See id. at 76.
67. E.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986); Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). Various state supreme courts have agreed.
E.g., Nebraska v. Burchett, 399 N.W.2d 258, 264 (Neb. 1986).
68. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
69. Id. at 513. Illinois, at the time, was operating under a state law that
authorized challenges for cause on any venireman who, "on being examined,
state[s] that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or
that he is opposed to the same." Id. at 512 (quoting 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/115-4 (West 2000)). The current version of this statute omits the original
language completely and indicates instead that "[elach party may challenge
jurors for cause." Id.
70. Id. at 513. At one point during voir dire, the trial judge even specifi-
cally stated: "Let's get these conscientious objectors out of the way, without
wasting any time on them." Id. at 514.
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a procedure was a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights to due process and to adjudication by a jury of his
peers.71 Partially agreeing, the Supreme Court held the Illinois
statute improper in its current form.72 The Court went on to estab-
lish guidelines that should be used to determine whether a poten-
tial juror could be properly excluded from a capital jury. The
"Witherspoon Standard" was annunciated as follows: In a capital
case, veniremen could be excluded for cause if they:
made [it] unmistakably clear (1) that they would auto-
matically vote against the imposition of capital punish-
ment without regard to any evidence that might be
developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that
their attitude towards the death penalty would prevent
them from making an impartial decision as to the defen-
dant's guilt.73
In establishing this standard, the Court made several key
findings regarding death penalty juror attitudes. Most notably, by
excluding those who would automatically vote against the death
penalty, the Court demonstrated its belief that just because an in-
dividual has conscientious or religious scruples against the death
penalty does not necessarily mean that such an individual would
be unable to convict a capital defendant and inflict the death pen-
alty in the "proper case."74 This belief epitomizes the Court's rejec-
tion of the psychological evidence presented by the defendant
tending to show such a jury would indeed be biased against him. 75
While the Court did not rely on any empirical research of its own
in making this decision, it rather quite generally stated "[i]t has
not been shown that this jury was biased with respect to the peti-
tioner's guilt."76
Another important conclusion in Witherspoon was that the
71. See id. at 518; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State... .") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. .. ").
72. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522.
73. Id. at 522 n.21.
74. Id. at 515-16 n.9.
75. Id. at 517-18.
76. Id. at 518.
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Court specifically stated its decision in the case only rendered the
sentence of Witherspoon invalid, but not his conviction.77 This il-
lustrates the Court's continued belief that death penalty attitudes
held by jurors do not have an inherent effect on a juror's ability to
determine guilt or innocence. On the other hand, by establishing
the standard as it did, the Court did seem to acknowledge that
death penalty attitudes could in some circumstances effect a ju-
ror's ability to determine guilt.78 This conclusion follows from the
specific language used by the Court, when it stated that venire-
men may be excluded for cause when they made it "unmistakably
clear.., that their attitude towards the death penalty would pre-
vent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's
guilt."79
By making such jurors excludable, the Witherspoon Court
clearly demonstrated its conviction that certain individual beliefs
are so strong they cannot be set aside. However, the standard is
arguably flawed in that it will only exclude those who make it
unmistakably clear that their death penalty beliefs will affect
their ability to determine guilt. This fails to account for the view
held by many researchers that death penalty attitudes subcon-
sciously effect an individual's ability to determine guilt.8 0 Simply
exploring death penalty beliefs during voir dire should not be
enough to death qualify a juror because other attitudes, ignored by
the current death qualification, could negatively effect that per-
son's impartiality.
Courts have continuously altered the Witherspoon criteria and
have applied changing standards to expanded situations. The
strongest attack on the Witherspoon criteria came in Wainwright
77. Id. at 522 n.21.
78. See id.
79. Id. By adding this prong to the test, the Court appeared to recognize
that death penalty attitudes effect not only the penalty phase of the trial, but
also the juror's ability to impartially determine guilt or innocence.
80. See, e.g., Cowan et al., supra note 10 (reviewing empirical studies
conducted by a number of researchers). For example, a juror could qualify
under the Witherspoon standard if he stated that while he may have reserva-
tions against the death penalty, it would not affect his determination of guilt.
That person's view on the death penalty, however, may be linked to other at-
titudes and biases that would subconsciously affect his or her vote on
whether to convict or acquit the defendant. See discussion supra Part II.
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v. Witt.8l In that case, the Court seemed frustrated with the high
burden of proof required by the Witherspoon standard which re-
quired a showing that an individual would never vote for the
death penalty.8 2 Furthermore, that standard did not focus on
when veniremen could be excluded from capital cases, but rather
only on when they could not be excluded.8 3 To remedy this prob-
lem, the Wainwright Court established the following standard: "A
prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her
views on capital punishment... [when] the juror's views would
'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instruction and his oath."'84
Unlike the Witherspoon criteria, Wainwright did not focus on
death penalty attitudes in particular. Rather, it centered on the
idea that as long as a juror is able to follow instructions under the
law, then that juror should be allowed to serve.85 As a result, the
Court made it easier for prosecutors to exclude more jurors be-
cause of their feelings about capital punishment.8 6
The Witherspoon standard required exhibiting unmistakably
clear bias that a potential juror would automatically vote against
the death penalty. After Wainwright, however, this high burden of
proof is not required. Therefore, veniremen who may only have
scruples against the death penalty but would not automatically
vote against it could arguably be excluded from service if such be-
liefs could interfere with their role as jurors. This may allow
prosecutors to eliminate more individuals who have fewer biases
against a defendant than those who are completely in favor of the
death penalty.
81. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
82. See id. at 421-22. Additionally, while the Witherspoon standard had
been in use for a number of years, the Court pointed out that the standard
was contained in a footnote of the Witherspoon opinion and interpreted it as
mere dicta. Id. at 422.
83. See id. at 421-22.
84. Id. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
85. See id.
86. Craig Haney et al., "Modern" Death Qualification: New Data on Its
Biasing Effects, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 619, 624 (1994) ("As expected, appli-
cation of the Witt standard did increase the size of the groups of persons who
were excludable on the basis of their death penalty opposition.").
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B. Judicial Rejection of Empirical Data on Death Qualification
Biases
1. Despite Alleged Biases, the Death Qualification Process is
Constitutional
Many courts justify the process of death qualification on legal
grounds, overlooking any empirical research indicating the biases
inherent in the process,87 and dismissing those problems as insuf-
ficient to hold the procedure an unconstitutional violation of a de-
fendant's rights.8 8 For example, in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 9 the
Court held that a death qualified jury was not extraordinarily
conviction prone, and therefore, could decide the fate of a man not
subject to capital punishment. 90 More importantly, the Court ra-
tionalized the constitutionality of death qualification by holding
that it does not violate a defendant's right to a jury selected from a
representative cross-section of the community. 91 Despite any atti-
tudes that death excludables may share, they were held not to
constitute a distinctive group for fair cross-sectional purposes be-
cause their exclusion was not based on a cognizable trait such as
87. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986).
88. United States v. Edelin, 118 F. Supp. 2d 36, 47 (D.D.C. 2000).
The Supreme Court in McCree and in Buchanan assumed the valid-
ity of the studies before it and still ruled that the death qualified
jury was a valid and constitutional instrument of the courts. The
Supreme Court was not willing to find in McCree and Buchanan that
the prejudice associated with a death qualified jury was sufficient to
mandate another system of selecting juries ....
Id. (citations omitted).
89. 483 U.S. 402 (1987).
90. Id. at 413, 420. The Court justified the process to such a degree that
it was held to be constitutional to use a death qualified jury against a defen-
dant who was not even having the death penalty sought against him. Id. at
419-20. The case involved two co-defendants, but the death penalty was only
sought against one. Because the death penalty was sought, the death qualifi-
cation process was used to obtain the jury. Id. at 407-08. This was a non-
bifurcated trial, so a single jury heard and decided all of the evidence against
both defendants. Id. The Court held that even though the death penalty was
not sought against one defendant, the death qualification process did not cre-
ate an impartial jury for him, and therefore, there was no violation of his
Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 419-20.
91. Id. at 415.
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race or sex. 92 On the contrary, death excludable jurors are only ex-
cluded for their inability to perform in accordance with the jury
instructions. 93
Much of the reasoning in Buchanan was derived from a case
decided one year earlier, Lockhart v. McCree.94 Lockhart's impor-
tance lies in its full examination of the empirical research on
death qualification biases,95 and rejecting that the Constitution
does not prohibit the death qualification process in capital cases. 96
Like Witherspoon, Lockhart involved a defendant's allegation that
a jury of death qualifiers violated his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights and deprived him of his right to have "his guilt
or innocence determined by an impartial jury selected from a rep-
resentative cross section of the community."97 The Court rejected
these claims and held that the death qualification process did not
deny the defendant his constitutional protections. 98
The Lockhart Court made two crucial findings in rendering its
decision. First, the Lockhart Court found that a death qualified
jury was not unconstitutionally impartial because such a jury
could have been selected even without the use of the death qualifi-
cation process. 99 Second, the Court held that death qualified jurors
92. See id. at 413; cf J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31
(1994) (holding that discrimination on the basis of gender in the exercise of
peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause); Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (holding that jurors could not be excluded solely
because of their race).
93. See Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 416.
94. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
95. See id. at 167-73.
96. Id. at 173.
97. Id. at 167.
98. Id. at 184.
99. Id. at 178. The Court noted that even McCree, the defendant in
Lockhart, admitted that the jurors in the case "could have ended up on his
jury through the 'luck of the draw,' without in any way violating the
constitutional guarantee of impartiality." Id. McCree argued that the process
of death qualification itself biases some jurors to view the case in a certain
way and was therefore unconstitutionally prejudicial against the defendant
in a capital case. Id. However, the Court found this argument "illogical and
hopelessly impractical" because if the same jurors could have been selected
even without the death qualification process, there is no sense in the
argument that there would be injustice if they happened to be selected
through death qualification instead. Id.
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were not excluded because they belonged to a cognizable group 0
Rather, death excludables were removed from jury service because
of their inability to follow the law. o'0 Therefore, the death qualifi-
cation process was held not to violate the Constitution, nor was it
found to give even the appearance of unfairness, because it simply
eliminated those who could not legally obey the rules required for
j urors. 0 2
The Lockhart Court further found that even if it were to ac-
cept the defendant's cognizable group argument, non-death quali-
fied jurors are not a cognizable group for fair cross-section
purposes. 0 3 The Court articulated that cognizable groups for fair-
cross sectional analysis refer predominantly to race and gender,
and not to groups based on shared attitudes.0 4 Non-death qualifi-
ers may be excluded, even as a group, because unlike race or sex,
attitudes can arguably be controlled. 0 5 Therefore, groups defined
solely based upon shared beliefs that make members of the group
unable to serve as jurors in a particular case may properly be ex-
cluded from jury service "without contravening any of the basic ob-
jectives of the [constitutional] fair-cross-section requirement." 10 6
The Court reasoned further that "[blecause the group of
'Witherspoon-excludables' includes only those who cannot and will
not conscientiously obey the law with respect to one of the issues
in a capital case, 'death qualification' hardly can be said to create
an 'appearance of unfairness."' 10 7 What may be inferred from
Lockhart is that even if all the empirical data is true - that death
qualifiers do have common attitudes and biases that tend to favor
100. See id. at 175-76.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 177.
104. Id. at 176-77.
105. Id. at 176.
106. Id. at 177.
107. Id. at 176. The Court fortified its position and summarized its holding
with the following statement:
[A] jury selected from a fair cross section of the community is impar-
tial, regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually repre-
sented on the jury, so long as the jurors can conscientiously and
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the prosecution - the data appears to do little to dissuade the Su-
preme Court Justices from allowing death qualifiers to sit on a
capital case, so long as the jurors state they can follow their oath.
2. The United States Legal System Refuses to Rely on the
Empirical Research
Witherspoon and Lockhart best demonstrate the Supreme
Court's refusal to rely on empirical research on death qualification
biases. One of the most remarkable aspects of Witherspoon was
the Court's implicit request for further empirical data on the ef-
fects of death qualification.10 8 This request was made in response
to the Court's review of several early empirical works regarding
death qualification.10 9 At the time, the Court found that the re-
search on the subject was too "tentative and fragmentary" to con-
clusively determine that death qualified jurors are inherently
filled with pro-prosecution biases. 110 The Court's consideration of
the empirical data, however, must have created much optimism in
the scientific world that future studies could influence the Court
to acknowledge the problems inherent in death qualification. This
optimism must have turned to disappointment when the legal sys-
tem continued to reject the research.
Witherspoon was certainly not alone in its rejection of the em-
pirical research."1 In fact, Lockhart paid more attention to the
108. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18 (1968). The Court
stated that "[iun light of the presently available information, we are not pre-
pared to announce a per se constitutional rule .... Id. at 518 (first emphasis
added). This statement may be interpreted as a suggestion by the Court that
further empirical evidence may sway it in a different direction in the future.
Namely, the statement may mean the Court could be convinced the death
qualification process is unconstitutional if newer and more reliable studies
supported such a conclusion.
109. See id. at 517 n.10. In Witherspoon, the Court explained that it exam-
ined and commented on the following studies: W.C. Wilson, Belief in Capital
Punishment and Jury Performance (1964) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the University of Texas); F.J. Goldberg, Attitude Toward Capital Pun-
ishment and Behavior as a Juror in Simulated Capital Cases (undated) (un-
published manuscript, on file with Morehouse College); H. Zeisel, Some
Insights Into the Operation of Criminal Juries 42 (Nov. 1957) (confidential
first draft, on file with the University of Chicago). Id.
110. Id. at 517.
111. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 415 n.16 (1987);
United States v. Edelin, 118 F. Supp. 2d 36, 47 (D.D.C. 2000).
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empirical data on death qualification than any other case.112 Lock-
hart took an in-depth look at the research on death qualified ju-
rors, but like its predecessors, did not trust the findings and held
them inapplicable to its legal conclusion.113 In making this deter-
mination, the Lockhart Court implicitly refuted the findings of
Grigsby v. Mabry,1 4 one of the few cases that relied on the empiri-
cal data to conclude that death qualification produces a jury more
likely to convict.115
The Court offered great detail as to why it rejected the em-
pirical data. First, the conclusion reached in Grigsby was held er-
roneous because it was based upon several of the same studies
that were examined, and ultimately rejected, in Witherspoon.16
Second, the Court rejected many of the newer studies used in
Grigsby because it felt that they lacked real world applicability. 117
Third, many of the studies did not simulate actual jury delibera-
tions, and the Court apparently believed this deviation could im-
pact the results of the empiricists. 118 Furthermore, none of the
studies relied on in Grigsby were able to predict what would occur
if a death excludable juror was allowed on a capital jury.119 Be-
cause no positive effects of allowing death excludables to hear
112. See 476 U.S. 162, 167-73 (1986).
113. Id. at 173.
114. See id. at 171; Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983),
stay granted, 583 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Ark. 1983), affd as modified, 758 F.2d
226 (8th Cir. 1985).
115. See Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1323. This finding was later affirmed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Grigsby, 758 F.2d
at 242, 243. In Lockhart, the Supreme Court found the Grigsby analysis erro-
neous, because none of the studies available at the time of Grigsby convinc-
ingly demonstrated that death qualified jurors were conviction prone. See 476
U.S. at 171.
116. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 171; see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 517-18 (1968). The Lockhart Court reasoned that if the studies were
"too tentative and fragmentary" at the time of Witherspoon in 1968, then
there was no reason to regard the same studies as acceptable, reliable data at
the time of Lockhart in 1985. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 171 (quoting Witherspoon,
391 U.S. at 517).
117. See id. For instance, several of the studies involved participants who
were not actual jurors sworn under oath to apply the law to the facts of an
actual case. Id. Because the experiments did not involve a real capital defen-
dant whose life hung in the balance, the Court had doubts about whether
these studies accurately predicted the behavior of actual jurors. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 171-72.
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capital cases were demonstrated by the studies presented to the
Court, the Court found no need to change the process, and held
that death qualification was constitutional. 120
One might argue the Supreme Court was not completely blind
to the problems of death qualification but that the Court was only
following a long-held tradition of apprehension toward death
qualification studies in general. 121 One argument supporting the
Court's refusal to rely on the research is that many social studies
are irrelevant because they are based on general studies of large
groups and do not focus on the specific individuals of the case.
Thus concerns arise about how scientists can link the generalized
information to the particular case. 122 The Court arguably finds the
death qualification studies inapplicable because the studies' find-
ings are not necessarily descriptive of the potential jurors in the
individual case at hand.123
A second argument is that the Court may exclude social sci-
ence research because of its perceived similiarity to character evi-
dence. 124 Courts may believe that the research describing human
traits and dispositions is akin to character evidence, which is "ex-
clud[able] in most situations because its probativity is considered
as relatively slight and its potential for prejudice relatively
great."125 A court treating death qualification research as charac-
ter evidence may be less willing to apply it in a particular case.
126
Death qualification research is similar to character evidence in
that it focuses on the traits, beliefs, and personalities of potential
jurors and the connection of such traits to death penalty out-
120. Id. at 173.
121. See, e.g., id. at 171 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517) ("[If these
studies were 'too tentative and fragmentary' to make out a claim of constitu-
tional error in 1968, the same studies, unchanged but for having aged some
18 years, are still insufficient to make out such a claim in this case.").
122. Robert P. Mosteller, Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony Concerning Social Framework Evidence, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 100 (1989).
123. See, e.g., Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 171-172.
124. See Mosteller, supra note 122, at 104 ("The traditional treatment of
character evidence may have broad importance for the admissibility of social
framework evidence.").
125. Id.
126. See id. ("One may argue that social framework evidence generally re-
sembles character evidence and should be admissible according to rules simi-
lar to those governing character evidence.").
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comes: 127 "Just as character may indicate a propensity for an indi-
vidual to act in a certain way, social framework evidence about a
relevant group provides guidance in predicting individual con-
duct."128 These modes of analysis for Supreme Court rejection of
social science research may be analogized to general judicial rejec-
tion of specific social research on death qualification for similar
reasons. 129
These arguments, however, can be readily refuted. For in-
stance, the argument that many social studies are irrelevant be-
cause they are based on general studies of large groups and do not
focus on the specific individuals of the case fails to take into ac-
count the obvious fact that a large study sample is needed to pre-
dict juror behavior in specific cases because the voir dire group in
each particular case is likewise being drawn from the community
at large. 130
Furthermore, the argument that courts should treat death
qualified research as character evidence may easily be rebutted
with the fact that social science research is not intended to predict
or explain the behavior of any party or witness to the trial, the
purpose for which character evidence is often introduced.' 3 ' In-
stead, the purpose of social science research is to show that all
humans have inherent beliefs tied to the death penalty that
should be taken into account when evaluating capital jury selec-
tion criteria, and to provide an understanding that inherent flaws
exist in the jury selection system that mandate changing the con-
stitutional quid pro quo. 32 Because social science evidence is not
utilized the same way character evidence is utilized, it should not
be treated similarly.
127. See id.; Jurow, supra note 21, at 576 (hypothesizing that conviction
proneness is a function of the personal beliefs of specific jurors).
128. Mosteller, supra note 122, at 104.
129. See, e.g., Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173 (rejecting empirical studies on
death qualification and holding them insufficient to support a determination
that the death qualification process is unconstitutional).
130. Rather than making the studies irrelevant, the generalization is nec-
essary to give the studies credibility. A study involving only the jurors of one
particular case would lack credibility and predict nothing about juror atti-
tudes regarding future cases.
131. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 186 (John
W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999).
132. See Jurow, supra note 21, at 567-68.
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Moreover, even if courts were to treat social science evidence
the same as character evidence, social science evidence should still
be admissible under a character evidence analysis. There are some
purposes for which character evidence is allowed. 133 For example,
one purpose for which character evidence is allowed is to attack
the credibility of a witness with evidence of a reputation for un-
truthfulness. 134 Character evidence is often introduced in practice
to show potential bias of a witness as well. Similarly, social sci-
ence evidence should be admitted to attack a jury member's char-
acter with a claim that they are biased against the defendant due
to the death qualification process.
Nonetheless, in Lockhart, the empirical data was still explic-
itly rejected. 35 However, the specificity of the rejection of the data
in the Lockhart opinion can be seen as a small victory. The Lock-
hart Court clearly articulated what it thought the studies were
lacking and in which areas it felt they were most weak. After
Lockhart, perhaps researchers may now develop studies that at-
tempt to eliminate the problems stated by the Court. With such
development there might be the possibility for further re-
examination of the death qualification process. There does remain
the possibility, however, that courts simply do not want to believe
the data because of the disruption it would cause the jury selec-
tion system. No matter what changes are performed in the subse-
quent research studies, it is possible the Court may continue to
find some way to discredit the studies, or hold them insufficient to
require a change in death qualification.
IV. MANDATING QUESTIONS AIMED AT ELIMINATING DEATH
QUALIFICATION BIASES: A PRACTICAL SOLUTION
If the empirical research is accepted as true, and the repeat-
ability of the findings indicates that it should, then it is obvious
there are flaws in the death qualification process. While these
problems are easily observable, a possible solution is not as recog-
nizable.
One of the simplest solutions, one might argue, would be to
eliminate death qualification altogether. However, in a nation
133. See FED. R. EVID. 404,405, 608.
134. FED. R. EviD. 608.
135. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173.
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where the death penalty is still an accepted form of punishment in
some states, 136 such a solution is unrealistic because it would
eliminate any use of the death penalty as a form of punishment. If
death qualification were removed, the death penalty would hardly
ever be used, because non-death qualifiers, now eligible to serve
on capital juries, could nullify the choice of the death penalty as a
sentence. The dilemma is the proverbial double-edged sword:
without death qualification, guilty defendants may not be con-
victed or sentenced to death; but if death qualification continues
in its current form, conviction prone jurors will serve in capital
cases, thereby impairing a defendant's chances of an acquittal.
The solution then lies not in a total removal of death qualification,
but through a change in the form of voir dire questioning.
As a general proposition, the flaws in the death qualification
process can be alleviated to a certain degree by mandating in capi-
tal cases a minimum level of specific voir dire questions aimed at
eliciting jurors who are death qualified, yet have a reduced level of
pro-prosecution biases. While the empirical studies suggest that
death qualified jurors are conviction prone and have attitude bi-
ases against the defendant, it must be remembered that these are,
for the most part, statistical studies. This means that while re-
searchers' data indicates that death qualified jurors are more
likely to have the pro-prosecution beliefs mentioned above, it does
not follow that all death qualified jurors hold such opinions. Re-
quired questions should be asked, preferably by the neutral judge
during voir dire, that are designed to extract from the venire
group those jurors who are death qualified but do not hold pro-
prosecution biased attitudes and who are not conviction prone.
A. A Change in the System is Justifiable
While a set of mandatory voir dire questions may seem like a
radical change in the voir dire system, this change is appropriate
and justifiable. First of all, it is not such a radical change beyond
the bounds of the law. Numerous other aspects of the voir dire
system are controlled by the courts under already-promulgated
rules of law. One such aspect of voir dire that has historically been
136. See States with the Death Penalty, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/ (last visited December 7, 2004) (providing information on every state
that still imposes the death penalty).
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controlled is the allowance for and limitation of preemptory chal-
lenges.137 Additionally, judges are often given the discretion to dic-
tate what types of questions will be asked as well as the
procedures used in questioning (i.e. questionnaires, one-on-one in-
dividual questioning, etc.). 138 A number of statutes also prescribe
different requirements for voir dire, several even specifically
geared toward regulating voir dire in capital cases. 139 Because due
process apparently is already presumed to permit the courts and
the legislature to be heavily involved in regulation of the voir dire
process, requiring certain questions to be asked by judges during
capital voir dire would not be an overstep of any legal bounds.
The Wainwright Court confirmed that voir dire should be
regulated at least to an extent by annunciating a standard by
which prospective jurors may be excluded for cause. 40 While the
Supreme Court did not require specific questions during voir dire
in Wainwright, it did set the standard as to what types of jurors
were properly excludable.141 It follows that requiring particular
voir dire questions that specifically bring to light how particular
jurors fit into the Wainwright standard may also be a justifiable
process. 42
Furthermore, a mandated set of questions is justified in that
capital voir dire has been anything but a stable practice. The
courts have continuously had to reevaluate the process of death
qualification and change its mechanics and application. For in-
stance, in Davis v. Georgia,143 the Court had to decide if there
were grounds for reversible error if only one juror was improperly
137. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(b).
138. See, e.g., McCullah Memorandum, supra note 17.
139. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1998) ("A person charged with... [a] capi-
tal offense shall.., be furnished with a copy of the indictment and a list of
the veniremen ... stating the abode of each venireman .... ."). While not deal-
ing specifically with the content of voir dire questions, this is an indication of
statutory control and regulation of juror selection procedures.
140. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1984) ("That standard is
whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the per-
formance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath.'").
141. Id.
142. But see id. at 424-25 (stating that "many veniremen simply cannot be
asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made
'unmistakably clear'").
143. 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
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excluded under the Witherspoon standard. 44 The Court held that
it was error. 145 Further, in another indication that the judiciary
should perhaps be involved with mandating specific death penalty
voir dire questions, the Court in Morgan v. Illinois,146 while not
mandating specific questions as proposed here, did determine that
certain questions were not specific enough to effectively achieve
the goal of death qualification. 47 The issue in Morgan was
whether "general fairness and 'follow the law' questions" were suf-
ficient to satisfy the defendant's right to make inquiry regarding
whether juror's were biased.' 48 The Court held that general inquir-
ies into a prospective juror's ability to follow the law were not suf-
ficient to effectively determine if that juror could in actuality
follow the law.' 49 This implies that specific inquires are required
by the Court to truly understand a venire person's ability to serve
in accordance with the law. If such specificity is required in ques-
tioning, the Court should mandate those particular questions that
it decides are specific enough to ensure death qualification's effec-
tiveness.
One of the key justifications for mandating specific voir dire
questions in capital cases is the importance for the court system to
144. Id. at 123.
145. Id. ("[11f a venireman is improperly excluded even though not so
committed [to voting against the death penalty regardless of the facts], any
subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand."). The issue in Davis was
whether the death penalty should stand when a juror who qualified for exclu-
sion under the Witherspoon standard because he would not automatically
vote against the death penalty was excluded by the prosecution because he
had some reservations about the form of punishment. Id. Because he was
properly death qualified, it was held to be reversible error to exclude the ju-
ror. See id.
146. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
147. Id. at 734-35.
148. Id. at 734.
149. Id. at 734-35 ("Witherspoon and its succeeding cases would be in large
measure superfluous were this Court convinced that such general inquiries
could detect those jurors with views preventing or substantially impairing
their duties in accordance with their instructions and oath."). The Court was
concerned that when people are asked generally if they could follow the law
in sentencing, prospective jurors might believe that they could be impartial
without truly realizing the effects that their death penalty attitudes would
have on their ability to follow the juror oath: "It may be that a juror could, in
good conscience, swear to uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintain-
ing dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would prevent him or her from
doing so." Id. at 735.
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maintain an impression of fairness and impartiality to the public.
Lockhart specifically stated that one of the purposes of having a
fair cross-section requirement is to "preserv[e] 'public confidence
in the fairness of the criminal justice system."'150 Grounds for
change exist if the public does not feel that a defendant is given a
fair chance in a capital trial.15' That being so, a court has a duty to
improve its image in the eyes of citizens. Any lack of faith by the
citizenry in the legal system's fairness and impartiality may be
argued to undermine the validity of any decisions made by a court.
Moreover, the impaneling of pro-prosecution jurors removes
fundamental fairness by inhibiting the capital defendant's right to
a reasonable doubt. As empiricists show, such jurors are more
likely to believe the defendant is guilty even before any evidence is
presented; 52 therefore, less is arguably needed for them to believe
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This in turn
denies a defendant the fundamental fairness that was desired of
our system when the reasonable doubt standard was established.
Despite this possibility, as has been repeatedly held by the Court,
the empirical data on death qualification is not considered suffi-
cient to overturn the death qualification process on constitutional
grounds. 53 In other words, death qualification is constitutional
and does not deny a capital defendant of his fundamental rights
according to the Court. However, nothing in this proposal would
require the Court to classify death qualification as unconstitu-
tional. The suggestion is simply that the empirical data be held
sufficient to warrant an alteration of the process from its current
form. Death qualification would thus remain constitutional; yet,
through further questioning to elicit pro-prosecution biases, soci-
ety, and more importantly defendants, would be assured of the
fairness of the system.
Coincidentally, it appears that courts might be on the verge of
mandating specific questions based on the active role the law has
taken in supervision of capital voir dire. For instance, numerous
decisions have established rulings on certain questions in capital
150. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174-75.
151. While the courts choose to not rely on the empirical studies indicating
death qualification biases, there is no indication that the nation at large
would not believe in the veracity of the research.
152. See discussion supra Part II.
153. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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voir dire that were deemed either to be relevant or in error. 54 In
addition, legal analysts have consolidated lists of specific question
suggestions based upon these court rulings in a number of
forms. 155 Moreover, it is a general principal that the trial judge
has the discretion to decide which questions to allow and disallow
and how the process of voir dire is to be conducted. 56 Arguably, if
courts are maintaining control over what questions should or
should not be excluded from voir dire, they should also have the
authority to require particular questions. Although mandate is a
considerable leap from simple allowance of certain questions, it is
the best way to ensure eradication of death qualification biases.
In the alternative to requiring specific voir dire inquiries,
questions could be developed as a practitioner's guide. 57 Judges
could be piloted with a series of specific questions geared toward
eliciting death qualification biases. There are, however, problems
with such a system. First, if such questions are only to be sugges-
tions, there is the strong possibility they will not be used in every
case, or even a majority of cases. If this result ensues, the change
will not purge the system of the biases and unfairness inherent in
the current death qualification process. In addition, questions for
154. See, e.g.,VERNON'S OKLAHOMA FORMS 2D: CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 21.24 (2002) (informing that the Oklahoma Criminal Court of
Appeals will review a juror's entire voir dire to determine if the trial court
properly excluded that juror for cause and indicating that specific questions
may be held to be error when they are worded insufficiently or unfairly).
155. See, e.g., id. § 21.25:
Relevant inquiries by counsel may include questions concerning the
"three punishment options, their beliefs about the death penalty,
their religious affiliation, their faith's position on the death penalty,
whether they would consider mitigating evidence and whether they
would follow the trial court's instructions." The meaning of a life sen-
tence and a sentence of life without parole, however, have been held
an improper subject for voir dire. In addition, a capital defendant is
entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim
and questioned on the issue of racial bias when accused of an inter-
racial crime. As to any other "special circumstances" that may be
relevant in the case, the trial judge retains discretion concerning the
form and number of questions on the subject, including the decision
whether to question the venire individually or collectively.
Id. § 21.25 (footnotes omitted).
156. Id. § 21.25; see, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 734-35 (1992);
Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976).
157. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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a practitioners guide are difficult to formulate because many of
the biases require a number of questions, rather than just one
question per possible bias, to elicit the proper information. Thus, a
collection of possible questions is not the desired solution. Rather,
this Comment seeks to require judges to use questions they decide
are detailed enough to elicit the aforementioned biases.
B. The Questions that Could Make Death Qualification More
Effective
The proposed solution of requiring specific voir dire questions
has the purpose of eliminating the biases that many empiricists
believe are held by a majority of death qualifiers. 158 As already ar-
ticulated, not all death qualified jurors have these pro-
prosecution, crime control biases; therefore, it could be possible to
achieve a death qualified jury who is not conviction prone. To ac-
complish this, perhaps it should be left to the researchers them-
selves to develop an empirical system where specific questions
could be asked to find this small group of "ideal jurors" sought in a
capital case. This would not be the first time the legal system has
invited the scientific world to conduct research in this area. 159
However, until the social scientists take up this calling, an abun-
dance of the specific questions that may achieve this sought-after
goal of an unbiased capital jury may be found simply by examin-
ing some of the already existing questions asked by judges and at-
torneys who have tried capital cases. Many questions currently
exist that are valuable in eliciting the biases of death qualifiers. If
some of these questions were to become mandatory in all capital
cases, it would serve the purpose of establishing the appearance of
an impartial system.
A problem empiricists found is that death qualifiers who are
legal authoritarians are more likely to believe prosecutors and
their witnesses. 160 Instead of simply asking generally whether a
juror could follow the law, the bias of legal authoritarianism could
158. See discussion supra Part II.
159. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18 (1968) (indicating
that the data adduced and presented at the time was insufficient to hold that
the death qualification process was unconstitutional). The Witherspoon opin-
ion may suggest that further research regarding death qualification could be
enough for the Court to invalidate the current process.
160. See Thompson et al., supra note 5, at 105; see also supra note 50.
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be extracted by simple questions. For instance, a juror could be
asked the following: "Would you judge the testimony of a law en-
forcement officer as you would that of any other witness, i.e., not
give his or her testimony any more or less weight merely because
he or she is a law enforcement officer?" 161 This is by no means
meant to imply that one simple question will be able to elicit the
sought-after biases or lack thereof, because as the courts have rec-
ognized, 162 jurors may not realize how their attitudes could actu-
ally effect their ability at trial.' 63 Several related questions,
however, if specific enough, should be helpful to determine how a
juror would respond to different situations. For example, in a New
York case, jurors were asked several specific questions related to
authoritarianism attitudes:
What is your opinion, if any, about prosecutors in gen-
eral?... What is your opinion, if any, about defense at-
torneys in general? ... When testifying as a witness in a
case, do you believe that police officers or FBI agents
have more credibility, less credibility, or the same credi-
bility as an ordinary citizen?... [and] Do you believe that
if a police investigation results in an arrest, the suspect
is: Guilty, Probably Guilty, [or] Probably Innocent? 164
These types of questions would be useful in uncovering those po-
tential jurors who have the same biases feared by the empiricists.
Several other juror biases may be determined from specific
voir dire questions as well, including juror attitudes about crime
and whether or not jurors possess the crime control biases that a
majority of death qualifiers have been alleged to possess. 6 5 For
example, several questions on this matter were used in United
States v. Jones, including: "In your opinion, what are the three (3)
most important problems with law and order today," and "[wihat,
161. Juror Questionnaire at q.69, United States v. Frank, 11 F. Supp. 2d
322 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (No. 97 CR 269(DLC)), available at
http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprccontents/litigation-guides/guideframe.htm
(last visited Sept. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Juror Questionairel.
162. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 735 (1992).
163. See Ronald C. Dillehay & Marla R. Sandys, Life Under Wainwright v.
Witt: Juror Dispositions and Death Qualification, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
147,148-49 (1996).
164. Juror Questionnaire, supra note 161 at q.65-68.
165. See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
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in your opinion, should or could be done about the crime prob-
lem?"166 While in form these questions may appear general, they
are open-ended enough to elicit a wide spectrum of information
and perhaps richly detailed answers that may shed light upon the
attitudes of a venire person. Questions like these may be helpful
in understanding what veniremen truly feel about the criminal
justice system by eliciting deeper ideas than just their opinion
about whether they can impartially serve or not. A comparison of
these specific questions with a more commonly used general ques-
tion, such as "[wiould your views on capital punishment influence
your verdict on whether the Defendant is guilty or innocent," 167
shows how the more specific questions can elicit more complete in-
formation about what a venire person truly believes and how he or
she will interpret the trial. Instead of simply answering "yes" or
"no" to whether the individual believes he or she will be impartial,
requiring longer explanations with their answers may help un-
cover deeper beliefs that can effect the way one will act as a juror.
This form of questioning will uncover specific attitudes that will
enable attorneys to effectively use their voir dire challenges.
The many ideologies associated with the "crime control" ap-
proach can each individually be revealed through the appropriate
questions. For instance, crime control believers feel less strongly
in the presumption of innocence than those with due process be-
liefs. 168 Questions to extract this bias could include having the ve-
nire person rate on an agreement scale how strongly he or she
believes in such statements as the following:
A defendant in a criminal case should testify or produce
some evidence to prove he or she is not guilty; ... [a] de-
fendant arrested for murder is presumed innocent;...
[and it] is possible that an innocent person could be ac-
cused and brought to trial for a crime he or she did not
166. Stipulated Joint Juror Questionnaire at q.47, 52, United States v.
Jones, No. 5:95-CR-047-C (N.D. Tex. 1995), aff/d, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir.
1998), affid, 527 U.S. 373 (1999), available at http://www.capdefnet.org/
fdprc/contents/litigation-guides/guideframe.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2004)
[hereinafter Stipulated Questionnaire].
167. F. LEE BAILEY & KENNETH J. FISHMAN, COMPLETE MANUAL OF
CRIMINAL FORMS § 51:6 (3d ed. 2003).
168. See Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 9, at 34; supra notes 44-50
and accompanying text.
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commit.169
This agreement scale, along with a required explanation of poten-
tial jurors' beliefs, would make the judge aware if potential jurors
actually believe in the presumption of innocence.
Similarly, death qualifiers believe it is better to convict an in-
nocent man than to acquit a guilty man. 170 This bias may be
brought to light by requiring the venire person to rate his or her
opinion and explain his or her beliefs about such statements as:
"It's better for a guilty person to go free than to convict an inno-
cent person." 71 Also, crime controllers are more likely to believe
the prosecution and have attitudes about each side before trial, 72
so a useful inquiry may include a question asking what is the first
thing that comes to the venire's mind when he or she thinks of a
defense attorney or prosecution attorney. 173 This would allow a
venire person to explain any prejudices that he or she may have
toward either side.
One of the problems with death qualification voir dire in its
current form is that jurors who are only asked general questions
are not given enough information to accurately predict or demon-
strate how they will perform and react to the evidence at trial.174
The dilemma is that the process "requires prospective jurors an-
swering questions about capital punishment during voir dire to
make self-judgments about unknown circumstances."'175 Because
currently used voir dire questions may not be specific enough to
inform individuals of what real life issues may confront them and
effect their judgments at trial, responses to these current voir dire
questions may be worthless because they do not accurately reflect
how that potential juror will actually behave at trial. Studies have
found that "a substantial percentage of juror candidates cannot be
expected to know what their role would entail were they to become
members of a jury in a capital case, and would, therefore, be likely
to be inaccurate when responding to questions based on [Wain-
169. Juror Questionnaire, supra note 161, at q.162, 164, 169.
170. Thompson et al., supra note 5, at 107-08.
171. Juror Questionnaire, supra note 161, at q.172.
172. Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 9, at 34.
173. Stipulated Questionnaire, supra note 166, at q.71.
174. Dillehay & Sandys, supra note 163, at 148-49.
175. Id. at 148.
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wright v.] Witt."17 6 This problem may be alleviated by asking spe-
cific questions aimed at eliciting known biases that may emerge
from death qualifiers at trial. The problem can be further resolved
by providing veniremen with hypotheticals creating situations
which may help the prospective jurors better understand what
their jobs will be and thereby increasing the accuracy of their voir
dire responses.
The use of hypothetical situations is thus another possibility
that could help discover biases. Situational questions are recom-
mended, in that they place in potential jurors' minds real images
while answering voir dire questions. For example, the judge could
give the following hypothetical in a homicide case:
Assume that you have been chosen as a juror in a murder
case and that you and other jurors have unanimously
found the person guilty of multiple intentional murders
with no legal justification, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, in this sense you know that the person is
guilty of more than one murder. Additionally, the jury
has unanimously found the person guilty of substantial
planning and premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt.
This constitutes an aggravating circumstance under the
law and permits the jury to impose the death penalty.
Now, in a case like that, could you in good conscience vote
for a sentence other than the death penalty or would you
vote for the death penalty?177
Presumably, upon hearing this fact scenario, the jurors will
place themselves in the hypothetical situation and other attitudes,
besides simply whether or not they think they can follow the law
and their juror oath, will rise to the surface and become apparent.
For instance, if the venireman were asked the previous ques-
tion, 78 the goal would seem to be to determine the individual's
ability to impose the death penalty. However, other attitudes may
also be learned from the venire's response, such as the venire's
176. Id. at 160.
177. Motion to Supplement The Court's Voir Dire Inquiry, As Necessary,
And Requested Supplemental Inquiry at q.C.1., United States v. Culbert, No.
CR-92-81127 (E.D. Mich. 1995), available at http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprc
contents/litigation-guides/guideframe.htm (last visited October 7, 2004)
[hereinafter Motion to Supplement].
178. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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ability to use mitigating factors in deciding on the proper punish-
ment in a case. The use of hypotheticals would be effective in elic-
iting such factors because the hypotheticals are not based on
abstract theoretical concepts, but rather on specific situations.
When jurors contemplate specific situations in the form of hy-
potheticals, they may go through the same thought processes that
they would use at trial, including feeling all of the attitudes they
as human beings use in making decisions. Therefore, hypotheti-
cals would be a useful tool for the courts to use to discover if, while
one may be death qualified, there are other attitudes that may get
in the way in a real life factual situation that would bias the indi-
vidual as a juror.
A slight variation on the use of hypotheticals would ask the
potential juror to place himself in the shoes of the defendant. The
judge could ask, for instance, the following: "If you were sitting in
the place of the defendant ... charged with the same offenses,
would you be willing to have a juror in your present frame of mind
sit in judgment on your case?... Please explain."'179 This would
enable the venire person to think about whether or not he would
want himself as a juror. This arguably would then be helpful in
ascertaining that individual's biases.
Another way of dealing with mitigating factors other than hy-
potheticals is to simply direct questions to the venire group re-
garding the specific mitigating factors. For example, in a case
where race will possibly be an issue, the judge could ask: "In de-
ciding punishment in a murder case would you consider, if a de-
fendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence, [that he]
'suffered the effects of racial discrimination.. 
.' as a reason or
mitigating circumstance not to vote for imposition of the death
penalty?"18 o The effect of other mitigating factors could also be in-
quired about by asking similar questions, such as: "In deciding
punishment in a murder case would you consider, if a defendant
proved by a preponderance of the evidence, [that he] 'was intro-
duced to drug abuse at an early age...' as a reason or mitigating
circumstance not to vote for imposition of the death penalty?"'8 '
Questions regarding mitigating factors are important in death
179. Juror Questionnaire, supra note 162, at q.222.
180. Motion to Supplement, supra note 177, at q.B.3.
181. Id. at q.B.4.
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penalty cases because, as already indicated, certain death quali-
fier attitudes diminish the weight the jury gives toward such miti-
gating factors. 182
This is just a small sample of some of the types of more spe-
cific questions that should be required during death qualification.
Concededly, there are a number of points of opposition to this pro-
posed solution. Some might believe that mandatory specific ques-
tioning would be overly time-consuming. This assumption is
untrue, because such questioning would not make voir dire any
lengthier than it has already become in capital cases. 8 3 For in-
stance, in some cases voir dire has lasted for days and even
weeks, 184 and some juror selection sheets contain hundreds of
questions. 85 Furthermore, many of the same questions recom-
mended here are from actual cases, so nothing radically different
would be added to voir dire. Instead, this proposal would create a
uniform system of the best questions available to elicit death
qualification juror biases. Juror questionnaires already encompass
a wide variety of topics, and are already quite time-consuming. 8 6
Thus, including certain mandatory questions would not likely in-
crease the time normally devoted to voir dire to an intolerable
level. Some juror selection sheets even ask questions such as, "do
you own a pet," 8 7 or "list your [three] favorite television shows." 188
While such questions are recognizably important to jury selection
by helping attorneys understand the personality of a venireman,
they are no more important than mandatory questions to elicit ju-
ror bias traditionally inherent in death qualified jurors. Both
types of questions may be asked, or such personality questions
may be altered so as to also elicit the potential juror biases death
qualification should bring to light. Therefore, the time consump-
182. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 51, at 269-70.
183. Death qualification voir dire is by no means, even in its current form,
a short process. See, e.g., Recommended Jury Selection Procedures at §§ C-D,
United States v. Frank, 11 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (No. 97 CR 269
(DLC)), available at http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprc/
contents/litigation-guides/guideframe.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2004).
184. Id. at § D.
185. See, e.g., Stipulated Questionnaire, supra note 166 (containing a
forty-seven page questionnaire with over two hundred combined questions).
186. See, e.g., id.
187. Id. at q.53.
188. Id. at q.91.
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tion argument must fail.
Another possible criticism to having a mandatory minimum
set of voir dire questions is that if, as is suggested, attorneys are
already using these questions, why then should courts mandate
what is already in practice? The answer is simply that not all at-
torneys - or judges - use the proper questions that can elicit the
biasing attitudes of death qualified jurors. As many groups advo-
cate, one of the biggest problems with capital cases is inadequate
representation for the defendant. 8 9 If defendants are poorly rep-
resented, it would be best to at least furnish them with a jury that
is not prone to convict them from the start of the trial. Mandatory
questions, presented by the judge and aimed at eliciting a death
qualified, unbiased jury, would provide the defendant a chance of
having his story believed, regardless of his attorney's abilities.
V. CONCLUSION
The alleged problems with death qualification are not un-
known to the courts. Courts have addressed the issue on several
occasions and have repeatedly failed to recognize the biases inher-
ent in the process, and the resulting obstacles for the defendant.
While the current death qualification process has been deemed
constitutional, courts still should attempt to remedy the biases in-
herent in the current process. Courts have reworked the process
on other occasions; thus, courts should accept the present chal-
lenge, if for no other reason than to preserve the appearance of
fairness in capital cases. However, any belief that all jurors who
are death qualified have biases and attitudes that favor the prose-
cution is an overstatement. While empirical data indicates that
jurors who have passed death qualification are more likely to be
conviction prone and hold pro-prosecution beliefs, it is incorrect to
say that all death qualified jurors hold those attitudes. Because of
this, it is possible to whittle down the class of death qualifiers fur-
ther to those death qualifiers with reduced biases against the de-
fendant. This could be accomplished by mandating specific
questions designed to discover those death qualified jurors with
the ability to be impartial. This would enable capital defense at-
torneys to make more effective use of their preemptory challenges
189. See, e.g., Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S. 486, 107th Cong. § 201
(2001).
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and hopefully, make it easier to obtain a jury less stacked against
the defendant.
This is a simple solution to the problem with arguably no ad-
verse effects. Even if courts are correct in their assumptions about
the empirical data, no harm would result from implementing this
procedure. Yet, if the courts have been wrong in their rejection of
empirical statistics on the death qualification process, this revi-
sion could tremendously increase a defendant's chances of obtain-
ing his guaranteed right to a fair, impartial trial. 190 Such an
essential and fundamental constitutional right cannot, and should
not, be denied.
Jesse Nason
190. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
